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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant Douglas
L. Rex ("Rex"), by and through his undersigned counsel of record, hereby petitions
this Court to withdraw its Memorandum Decision filed March 15, 2001 (the "Decision")
and reverse the decisions of the trial court for the reasons specified below.
INTRODUCTION
In rendering the Decision, this Court either overlooked or ignored several errors of
law committed by the trial court. The Decision fails to even address two of the grounds
for reversal raised by Rex. On two other issues the Decision is incorrect as a matter of
law. And the Decision closes its eyes to an irregularity in the process below so profound
that its effect is to that it erase the applicable rule of law. After this introductory
statement, each of these errors will be detailed.
The first error in the Decision is that there was no admissible evidence at all
supporting the trial court's grant of summary judgment. The "ledger sheets" relied upon
by the trial court, and in the Decision, were never introduced in an evidentiary form as
required by Rule 56. The testimony offered by John Tebbs on the same subject was also
inadmissible as lacking foundation and hopelessly conclusory. Thus, TFP's Rule 56
motion was wrongfully granted and the Decision was erroneous in affirming it..
This Court's second error in the Decision compounds the first error by a confusion
between the standard of review of a case tried to a jury as opposed to a case decided on
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summary judgment. The Decision relies on Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425, 434, n. 6
(Utah 1998) for the proposition that the Rule 59 decision below to deny a new trial will
be sustained if there "was an evidentiary basis" for it. While that proposition is true for a
case tried to a jury, such as Child, it is not the standard of review for a case decided on a
motion for summary judgment. Further, as shown above, there was no admissible
evidence to support the decision. Thus, Rex's Rule 59 motion was wrongfully denied
and the Court's Decision affirming that error was mistaken as a matter of law.
The Decision's third error was to completely ignore the obvious prejudice to Rex
caused by the misrepresentation to the trial court by Tebb's counsel regarding outstanding
discovery. If the trial court had known of the outstanding discovery, and at the same time
been aware of the impropriety of the withdrawal of Rex's counsel while a motion was
pending, the trial court should have, sua sponte, refused to grant summary judgment. The
discovery unresponded to by Tebbs (and unresponded to up as of the date of this Petition
for Rehearing) went to the heart of Tebbs' claims and Rex's defenses, i.e., who owed
what to whom, for what and subject to what setoffs.
Fourth, the Decision failed to consider the fact that the trial court never offered a
legal justification for its refusal to allow Rex to file a counterclaim as required by justice.
A counterclaim by Rex against Tebbs would have allowed the trial court to understand
the true relationship between the parties and the fictitious nature of the debt that the
Decision now requires Rex to pay.
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Fifth, the Decision failed to consider the trial court's egregious error in letting Mr.
Mitchell withdraw as counsel without the proper Rule 4-506 process, and Mr. Rex's
showing that he did not understand the import of being left unrepresented at a time when
the Rule 56 motion was pending and there was no response to or effort to compel
response to Rex's outstanding discovery.
Ultimately, the trial court steamrollered a party unrepresented (improperly) by
counsel into paying a debt that was not really owed and refused to allow that innocent
party to prove that simple fact. The Decision sustains that result. The Decision reaches
that result by ignoring the applicable law, misstating the evidence and confusing the
standard of review. This Court should reconsider its opinion and not sanction Tebbs' and
the trial court's miscarriage of justice.
ARGUMENT
1.

THE RULE 56 MOTION WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED IN THE
ABSENCE OF ANY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE
BALANCES OWED.
The Decision overlooks the fact that at the Rule 56 stage there was no accounting

as to how the respective balances claimed under each of the two alleged notes was
calculated, and no submission of competent evidence to substantiate those balances.
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The lack of such accounting and substantiating evidence was duly objected to by
Mr. Mitchell in his "STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS PRECLUDING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT" included in his memorandum opposing Rule 56 summary judgment:
1.
Plaintiff states [in Tebbs Affidavit Tf 7] that the amount
owing on the June 4, 1987 Promissory Note is $20,015.87 as of June
16, 1998. However, Plaintiff has not given the court or Defendant
any accounting as to how that amount was calculated, nor has
Plaintiff submitted competent evidence to substantiate the balance
claimed.
2.
Plaintiff states [in Tebbs Affidavit ^ 8] that the amount
owing on the January 2, 1991 Promissory Note is $60,915.35 as of
June 16, 1998. However, Plaintiff has not given the court or
Defendant any accounting as to how that amount was calculated, nor
has Plaintiff submitted competent evidence to substantiate the
balance claimed.
Rex SJ Memo., Statement of Disputed Factsfflf1, 2 (R 000037). The trial court
acknowledged these objections. Order, Findings of Fact ^ 6 ("Rex, thiough his counsel,
objected to the motion for a summary judgment on the grounds that Defendant didn't
believe the amounts claimed were accurate as the Plaintiff had, 'not submitted to the
court any competent evidence to substantiate the amounts claimed' ") (R 000306).
TFP sought to explain away this fatal defect to the trial court by referring to the
ledger sheets and to the John Tebbs affidavit as being evidence. TFP Brief at 11-12.
This Court wrongfully accepted this same erroneous excuse in the Decision. Decision, p.
1. However, this explanation is meritless in the face of the Rule 56 requirement that the
moving party present admissible evidence sufficient to support judgment, and the rule

that this Court pays no deference to the trial court's decision.
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Under Rule 56, the evidence and all submissions in support of or opposition to a
motion for summary judgment should be looked at in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Further, any evidence submitted in support of a motion for summary
must be evidence that would be admissible at trial. Rule 56, subparts (c), (e); Dupler v.
Yates, 351 P.2d 629, 636-37 (Utah 1960); Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah
1983).
TFP has claimed to the trial court and this Court that the ledger sheets were
"evidence." TFP has further claimed that "Rex did not, and has not, challenged the
sufficiency of the ledger sheets." Both statements are incorrect. That the Decision failed
to acknowledge this undisputable fact is ground for this Court to reconsider the Decision
and reverse the trial court.
The ledger sheets were attached to a reply brief in support of a Rule 56 motion.
They were unsigned and unsworn. They were without any foundation, were never
"offered" as evidence, and lacked any authentication or identification as required by Rule
901, Utah Rules of Evidence. They were merely argument, and clearly were not
evidence. Since they were mere argument, Rex wasn't required to "challenge" their
"sufficiency."1
1

Indeed, since the brief to which they were attached was a reply, the rules
did not contemplate a response by Rex to that reply. In fact, it may be that the
rules did not permit the attachment of the ledger sheets in the first place, since they
were argument concerning a new matter, namely, an effort to prove the material
fact of the basis on which the balances were computed.
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The only evidence TFP attempted to put in the record of the balances owed was
the John Tebbs affidavit. However, under Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah
1983), statements in an affidavit that are largely conclusory in form, and would not be
admissible in evidence, may not be considered on motion for summary judgment. Here,
John Tebbs made conclusory statements in his affidavit that he was familiar with the
accounting records and that the accounting records showed the amount due under each of
the alleged notes to be a certain amount. Those conclusory statements were inadmissible
because they lacked foundation identifying which accounting records were reviewed (i.e.,
just the ones related to the alleged "Notes" or all related records showing the relationship
between the "Notes" and other obligations) and Tebbs5 qualifications to review the
records. Further, Tebbs' affidavit testimony was not the best evidence of the accounting
records. Mr. Mitchell's objections to those conclusory statements are quoted at the
beginning of this Point I. Those objections should have been deemed sufficient under
Rule 56(e) and the Rules of Evidence to keep out Tebbs' inadmissible statements.
If Mr. Mitchell's objections are deemed sufficient to challenge the admissibility of
the Tebbs Affidavit, as they should be (especially in light of Mitchell's subsequent and
improper withdrawal as counsel), then the Judgment must be overturned without further
analysis. The Court pays no deference to the trial court's legal conclusion concerning
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such sufficiency. Glencore. Ltd. v. Ince. 972 P.2d 376, 379 (Utah 1998).2 TFP failed to
carry its burden of offering admissible evidence which proved entitlement to summary
judgment.3 The Decision utterly failed to address this issue. This Court must overturn
the Judgment.

2.

BECAUSE THE LEDGER SHEETS WERE NOT "EVIDENCE" AND THE
TEBBS STATEMENTS WERE INADMISSIBLE. THE EVIDENCE WAS
INSUFFICIENT UNDER RULE 59(a)(6),
The evidence supporting the Decision is insufficient as a matter of law under Rule

59(a)(6). The Decision erroneously treats the ledger sheets as "evidence."4 As noted in
Appellant's Reply Brief at 13, and again in Point I above, the ledger sheets were not
evidence, but were merely part of a lawyer's reply argument. They were unsigned,

2

If they are not sufficient, then Rex has submitted that this is a further basis
for excusable neglect on his part, as developed in Point III of Rex's Brief to this
Court.
3

Based upon this analysis, the Decision's citation to Thorncock and
assumption that proponent TFP had come "forward with facts in support of a
motion for summary judgment" (Decision at 2) is misplaced.
4
The error is in two places. On the first page, the Decision states that "The
evidence before the trial court on TFP's motion for summary judgment included . . .
the two ledger sheets." In consecutive sentences at the bottom of page 3, the Decision
refers first to "the two promissory notes, the Tebbs affidavit, and the ledger sheets,"
and then to "[t]his evidence." The very first time the ledger sheets were called
"evidence" (which they clearly were not, as noted herein) was TFP's Brief in this
appeal.
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unsworn, without foundation, never "offered" as evidence, and lacked authentication or
identification.
The only "evidence" on the balances owed under the two alleged notes was
conclusory statements made by John Tebbs in his affidavit that the accounting records
showed the amount due under each of the alleged notes to be a certain amount (Tebbs
Affidavit,fflf7, 8 (R 000025)). However, as established in Point I above, that evidence
(the conclusory statements as to the balances) was itself inadmissible, and was objected
to by Mr. Mitchell. Since the Tebbs statements were inadmissible and objected to, they
were likewise not properly in evidence. Norton, supra.
The Child test relied upon in the Decision as the basis for analyzing a Rule 59
motion was whether there " 'was an evidentiary basis for the trial court's decision' "
(Decision at 3). Child, and the cases cited by it, were cases actually tried to a jury. The
Child "evidentiary basis" test is bottomed on deference to a jury's consideration of live
evidence. See Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425, 434, n. 6 (Utah 1998). In the instant case
of summary judgment entered without even argument and with the defendant improperly
unrepresented by counsel, the only evidence of balances owed was Tebbs' inadmissible
and objected-to statements. Since under Norton those statements were not properly in
evidence, ipso facto, there was not "an evidentiary basis" for the balances claimed.
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This Court should not have paid any deference to the trial court's decision.
Glencore. Ltd. v. Ince. 972 P.2d 376, 379 (Utah 1998). Unfortunately, by repeating and
perpetuating the same errors the trial court made, the Decision effectively defers
completely to the trial court. Rex is entitled to a trial on this pivotal issue.

3.

TFP'S FRAUDULENT NOTICE TO SUBMIT WAS AN
IRREGULARITY WHICH PREVENTED REX FROM RECEIVING
A FAIR TRIAL.

In his notice to submit, TFP's counsel's fraudulent statement that there was no
outstanding discovery plainly prevented Rex from receiving a fair trial, contrary to the
Decision's holding of no prejudice in the second paragraph on page 3.5
The Interrogatories and Requests for Production for Documents6 served by Mr.
Mitchell went to the very issue of what was owed. TFP erroneously argued at page 20 of
its Brief that the ledger sheets were answers to the discovery. This Court erroneously

5

It appears even the Court of Appeals has difficulty keeping track of TFP's
misstatements, one of which was clearly made to the trial court and others of
which appear to be made to the Court. The Court refers in footnote 2 to Rex's
argument that "TFP committed fraud upon the trial court," and Rex's conclusion to
such argument that such fraud was an irregularity. The Court states in that footnote
that, such argument having been raised for the first time on appeal, the Court will
not consider the argument in light of Hart. However, in the following paragraph,
the Court does consider the argument, with the Court's erroneous no-prejudice
logic addressed in the text of this Point 2. The Court is correct in considering the
argument (albeit that it reaches the wrong conclusion as to it), in light of the Irwin
plain error showing made by Rex in his Brief at 29-30, and unrebutted by TFP.
6

Attached to Appellant's Brief as Addendum B.
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accepted that argument, holding that "The ledger sheets TFP submitted with its reply
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment were in answer to Rex's
outstanding discovery request." Decision at 3.
On this point, the Decision is almost shocking in its disregard of the rules of
discovery. As noted in Appellant's Reply Brief, the ledger sheets were not "answers" to
the outstanding interrogatories and requests for production. Reply Brief at 13. They did
not comply with the requirements of Rule 33(b) that Rex's discovery be answered by the
party "separately and fully in writing under oath" and that "The answers are to be signed
by the person making them." Id. That is, Rex's discovery simply was never answered.
Brief at 36; Reply Brief at 13, 15. Plaintiff was denied his day in court despite his
unresponded-to discovery that went precisely to the balance owed.
4.

REX ESTABLISHED THAT "JUSTICE REQUIRES" LEAVE TO SET UP
THE COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT,
Contrary to the Decision, Rex did cite to the record and did cite authority and

advance argument as to why "justice require[d]" leave to set up the counterclaim under
Rule 13(e). Brief, Point IV, at 40-42. Rex had previously apprised the trial court that the
leave to amend and consolidate he sought was driven by the need for a single accounting:
In the end, the operative facts in both cases concern the need for a
single accounting as to the professional accounting practice business
which is the subject of Case 3507 and as to the purported debt which
is the subject of the instant case (3508), in that such professional
accounting practice business and such purported debt are part of an
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inseparable whole as pled with particularity in the attached
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint.
Rex Memo, at 2-3 (R 000106-07) (emphasis added). The basis expressed by the trial
court for denying leave to file the omitted counterclaim was that supposedly "Defendant's
actual claims are in the nature of either compulsory or permissive counterclaims that are
clearly time barred." Order, Conclusions of Law f 12 (R 000310).
Neither TFP nor the trial court nor this Court in the Decision have ever identified
or established any "time bar" whatsoever. This issue was raised in detail in Rex's Brief:
There is [no time bar specified] in the record. There is none in fact
or law. On the contrary, as noted by Rex [to the trial court], there is
no harm to TFP from vacating the Judgment, since the two alleged
notes will and should be addressed by an accounting:
Ultimately, vacating the Judgment causes no harm to
plaintiff. The purported notes will be addressed by an
accounting, which plaintiff already seeks to a limited extent in
the case before Judge Thorne, and which defendant seeks in
its proposed Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. . . .
In the end, the plain facts dictate that the Judgment be vacated
and a detailed accounting be conducted. Support for this
proposition comes not only from common sense and fairness,
including the above reasoning under the relevant rules, but
also from the case cited by defendant that an allegedly
aggrieved party (here, plaintiff TFP) must bring an action for
an accounting rather than an action on the claimed debt.
Bankers Trust Co. v. Riter. 56 Utah 525, 190 P. 1113 (1920),
cited at defendant's Memorandum at 2. Such authority was
not responded to by plaintiff.
Rex Reply at 4 (R 000158). Rex plainly was entitled to leave under
Rules 13(e) and 14(a) to file a Counterclaim and Third-Party
Complaint on the basis that justice required the accounting and other
remedies sought therein.
Brief at 40-42. Rule 13(e)'s precise purpose is to allow filings that would otherwise be
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untimely, if "justice requires." Thus, the mere recital of a "time bar" is just the beginning
of the analysis, not the end. The question never addressed by the trial court, or this Court
in its Decision, was whether "justice required" allowing the counterclaim.
Here, Rex's argument was that justice required amendment because of the need for
an accounting as to the accounting firm's business, including the rent to be paid by the
accounting firm which Tebbs on behalf of TFP had agreed would be the sole source of
payment of the $6 LOOP note here sued on. Rex Memo, at 2-3 (R 000106-07); Brief at
40-42. Rex referred the trial court, and this Court, to the Counterclaim and Third-Party
Complaint attached to the Motion for New Trial for the evidentiary particulars of why the
two alleged notes here sued on were an integral part of the accounting practice, including
Tebbs' agreement that rent from the Prowswood office condominium occupied by Tebbs'
accounting firm was to be the sole source of payment on the $61,000 note. Id.
The trial court overlooked this issue despite its having been briefed, and now this
Court erroneously has done the same.
5.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULE 4-506(1) VIOLATION IN THE FACE OF
REX'S UNAWARENESS OF HIS EXPOSURE ESTABLISHED AN
"IRREGULARITY" AND "EXCUSABLE NEGLECT" ENTITLING REX
TO A NEW TRIAL.

This Court admitted there was "a technical violation of Rule 4-506(1)" in Mr.
Mitchell's withdrawal without order of court while a motion was pending. Decision at 4.
However, the Court held that such violation did not amount to excusable neglect under
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Rule 60(b)(1) or an irregularity in the proceedings under Rule 59(a)(1). Id.
The Court identified neglect by Mr. Mitchell prior to his withdrawal. Id., third full
paragraph. The Court concluded that "While these incidents might have constituted
neglect on the part of prior counsel, Rex fails to adequately explain how they give rise to
'excusable neglect' under Rule 60(b)(1)." Id. at 4. The last straw, according to the
Court, was that Rex received notice to appoint counsel after Mr. Mitchell withdrew. Id.
On the contrary, Rex established that the neglect by Mitchell led to Rex's own
neglect (namely, his failure to retain new counsel). Rex further established that his own
neglect was excusable because Rex was unaware of the possible importance of
controverting the Affidavit of John Tebbs by a counter-affidavit under Rule 56 stating
why the purported notes were not due. Further, Rex was not informed by Mr. Mitchell of
the possible need to controvert the Tebbs Affidavit in order to withstand summary
judgment, or of the need for Rex to take any other affirmative steps beyond the
opposition Mr. Mitchell had mounted before his unpermitted withdrawal. Rex Reply at
3-4 (R 000157-58); Supplemental Affidavit of Douglas L. Rex, 1 4 (R 000162-63).
Importantly, there is no showing in the record that Rex knew he had to do anything
beyond that which Mr. Mitchell had already done prior to his withdrawal. Again, the
Decision fails to address this issue.
Mr. Mitchell's neglect, and Rex's subsequent neglect, are both regrettable. But it
is precisely to prevent such sins from being visited upon lay parties that Rule 4-506(1)
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requires the motion and order process for withdrawals at certain pivotal points in the
litigation process. The trial court's "technical" violation, it is submitted, is a stunning
irregularity in the proceedings under Rule 59(a)(1), as well as a further basis for Mr.
Rex's own neglect.
This Court's failure to enforce Rule 4-506(1) would, if not now corrected by this
Court, effectively erase the withdrawal approval rule from the books.
CONCLUSION
The legal system continues to fail Douglas Rex and to deny him his day in court.
There was not any admissible evidence of the balances owed on the two alleged
notes, so TFP had not carried its burden and was not entitled to judgment under Rule 56.
In turn, because of the lack of such evidence, there was not "an evidentiary basis" for the
Judgment, making the evidence insufficient under Rule 59(a)(6).
The fraudulent notice to submit resulted in entry of summary judgment, so the
notice was an irregularity under Rule 59(a)(1) which was prejudicial and likewise entitled
Rex to reversal.
Rex did make a detailed evidentiary showing in the Rex affidavit filed in support
of his motion, ignored by the trial court and now by this Court, that a single accounting is
needed pursuant to amendment that would set up a counterclaim and third-party
complaint.
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And the trial court's serious violation of Rule 4-506(1) was both a stunning
irregularity, and an important basis of Rex's excusable neglect.

The undersigned hereby certifies that this Petition is presented in good faith and
not for delay.
DATED this 29th day of March, 2001.
BAIRD& JONES L.C.
Attorneys for Appellant

QJLlL

Michael F. Jones
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 29th day of March, 2001,1 caused two true and correct
copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING to be mailed,
postage prepaid, to:
Douglas T. Hall
4885 South 900 East, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117-5793
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